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E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/16/2028
TAGS: MTCRE PARM PREL
SUBJECT: ELIMINATION OF UKRAINIAN SCUD MISSILES

REF: LETTER FROM UKRAINE MOD (09/26/08)

Classified By: ISN/MTR DIRECTOR PAM DURHAM.
REASONS: 1.4 (B) AND (D)

¶1. (U) This is an action request. Please see para 4.

¶2. (S) Background: At the July 31-August 1 U.S.-Ukraine Nonproliferation Working Group (NPWG) meeting in Kyiv, Ukraine indicated its readiness to move forward to eliminate its SCUD missiles and related equipment. (NOTE: In 1994 the U.S. committed to facilitate Ukrainian membership in the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). By 1997, Ukraine had made substantial progress toward meeting U.S. criteria for membership in the MTCR. The remaining hurdle to U.S. support was Ukraine's willingness to forgo its MTCR Category I offensive military missiles. This issue was resolved in March 1998 when the USG and Ukraine concluded a confidential MOU, which, *inter alia*, committed Ukraine to eliminate at least one-half of its SCUD missiles and launchers by December 31, 2003 and the remaining systems by December 31, 2015. END NOTE.) We indicated that we were also ready to move forward, and provided a draft Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) (in Ukrainian) for review. We also offered a return visit of U.S. experts

in September to discuss the MOU in detail. Our expectation was that this visit would then be followed by a team of technical experts in late September/early October to assess/inventory the SCUDS and related equipment at the various sites.

¶3. (S) Ukraine did not respond to our request for a visit in September. However, we recently received a follow-up letter from Ukraine's Oleksandr Dotsenko, Director, Department of International Aspects of Non-Proliferation and Arms Control, National Security and Defense Council. The letter outlines several steps apparently aimed at completing the SCUD elimination project in an efficient and timely manner. In order to address the points raised in the GOU letter, we would like to again propose sending a team to Kyiv for discussions with GOU experts on the details of SCUD elimination.

¶4. (S) Action Request: Request Embassy Kyiv approach appropriate host government officials and seek agreement from the GOU for a visit of a U.S. team for a full day of SCUD elimination talks on November 14, 17, or 18. Post may draw on background information in paras 2-3 above and nonpaper/talking points below when making request.

¶5. (S) Begin Talking Points/Nonpaper:

(Secret/Rel Ukraine)

-- Consistent with our 1998 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) the U.S. remains prepared to discuss the provision of technical and financial assistance to eliminate Ukraine's SCUD missiles and equipment.

-- As discussed in Kyiv at the U.S.-Ukraine Nonproliferation Working Group meeting on July 31-August 1, we would like to

send a team to Ukraine to discuss the specifics of the issue.

-- The U.S. team also would be prepared to address the specific points raised in the letter we recently received from your government concerning the modalities of the SCUD elimination project.

-- We therefore propose one-day of talks in Kyiv on either November 14, 17, or 18.

-- We look forward to working with you on this matter and would appreciate your response at the earliest opportunity.

¶6. (U) Department appreciates Post's assistance. Please slug response to ISN/MTR and EUR/PRA.

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